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The novel Anna Karenina begins with the observation that “[a]ll
happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is un-
happy in its own way.”1 This insight suggests that for a marriage to
be happy it must succeed in several ways, while failure in one re-
spect means a marriage is doomed. The “Anna Karenina principle”
has been applied in various fields, from business entrepreneurship2
and animal domestication3 to ecology4 and ethics.5 In many human
activities, success “requires avoiding many separate possible causes
of failure.”6
When it comes to capital punishment, “abolitionist nations all
seem alike, but every death penalty nation is retentionist in its own
way.”7 In this version of the Karenina principle, abolition, and death
penalty reform more generally, may fail in many ways.
Much has been written about why the United States retains capi-
tal punishment, and the causes are contested.8 And most empirical
1. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Louise & Aylmer Maude trans., Knopf Inc. 1912)
(1873).
2. PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 34
(2014).
3. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997),
157.
4. Dwayne R.J. Moore, The Anna Karenina Principle Applied to Ecological Risk Assessments of
Multiple Stressors, 7 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 231, 231–37 (2001).
5. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 38 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford 2009) (c. 384
B.C.E.).
6. DIAMOND, supra note 3, at 157.
7. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABO-
LITION 22 (2010).
8. Cf. SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS AND ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007); STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:
AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2003); GARLAND, supra note 7; ANDREW HAMMEL, ENDING THE DEATH
PENALTY: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010); ANDREA D. LYON, THE
DEATH PENALTY: WHAT’S KEEPING IT ALIVE? (2014); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2003); Andrew Moravcsik, The New Abolitionism:
Why Does the U.S.  Practice the Death Penalty While Europe Does Not?, 4 EUR. STUD. 1 (2001); Carol
S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97 (2002); Moshik
Temkin, The Great Divergence: The Death Penalty in the United States and the Failure of Abolition in
Transatlantic Perspective (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP15-037, 2015).
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inquiries about retention and abolition—like most studies of capi-
tal punishment— are concentrated on the United States.9 This
preoccupation with the United States provides a “distorted and par-
tial view” of questions about continuity and change in death penalty
law, policy, and practice in the world.10 The United States is pecu-
liar in many respects,11 including capital punishment.12
By focusing on retention and reform in Japanese capital punish-
ment, this Article aims to explain the high degree of continuity in
that country’s death penalty. The Japanese case is important for at
least two reasons. First, Japan is rich and democratic but not West-
ern. As poor and undemocratic countries develop their economies
and polities, Japan could be a positive role model for those coun-
tries that want to retain the death penalty and a negative role model
for those that prefer to abolish or otherwise reform the institu-
tion.13 Second, Japan is an important part of Asia, a region home to
sixty percent of the world’s population and the majority of the
world’s executions.14 If Asia is “the next frontier” in the two-century
debate about whether state executions should continue,15 then ex-
amining how Japan is “retentionist in its own way” should provide
insights about obstacles to the campaign for abolition in that region
and in the rest of world.
This Article focuses on the failure of abolition and of death pen-
alty reform in Japan in order to illustrate contingencies in the
trajectory of capital punishment in the modern world. Part I de-
scribes three facts about postwar Japan that help explain why it
retains capital punishment today: a missed opportunity for aboli-
tion during the American occupation of the country after World
War II; the long-term rule of a conservative political party; and eco-
nomic and geopolitical power that has enabled the country to resist
the influence of international norms. Part II describes a few ways in
which Japanese capital punishment has changed in recent years—
and many ways in which it has not. Part III focuses on four causes of
9. ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 3
(4th ed. 2008).
10. Id.
11. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD (1996).
12. GARLAND, supra note 7.
13. Matthew J. Wilson, Seeking to Change Japanese Society Through Legal Reform, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 265 (Jeff Kingston ed., 2014) (describing how “emerging
countries study and even model their economic and legal systems after Japan”).
14. DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA xii (2009).
15. Id. at xi.
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continuity in capital punishment in Japan: the rarity of exonera-
tions in Japanese criminal justice; a jurisprudence that does not
treat death as a special form of criminal punishment requiring ex-
tra safeguards for criminal defendants in capital cases; a high
degree of secrecy surrounding executions and capital sentencing;
and a society in which race is not regarded as a salient factor in the
administration of capital punishment. Part IV suggests how reform
in Japanese capital punishment might be accomplished by chal-
lenging some of the causes of continuity. Part V concludes by
observing that the road to death penalty reform is not merely a pos-
itive path requiring leadership from the front in the face of public
support for the institution. It is also a negative path leading away
from beliefs and practices that present obstacles to the institution’s
diminution and abrogation.
I. JAPANESE RETENTION
The most striking death penalty trend is its decline around the
world.16 A few countries have been carrying out executions more
frequently in recent years (Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Ara-
bia), and a few others have been sentencing more people to death
(Egypt and Nigeria), but the overall trend is “towards abolition.”17
In the United States, seven states have abolished capital punish-
ment since 2007.18 Among states that retain the death penalty,
there have been large declines in death sentences and executions.19
In Texas, which has carried out more executions since 1976 than
the next six most frequent executing states combined, no person
was sentenced to death in the first six months of 2015.20 Texas’s
death row has also declined in size from 460 persons in 1999 to 257
in 2015—a drop of 44 percent.21 One question about the future is
whether the death penalty will continue to decline, as some experts
16. See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 9, at 14.
17. On the way out—with grisly exceptions; Capital Punishment, THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 2015,
at 50.
18. States With and Without Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
19. See generally DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2015: YEAR END
REPORT (2015), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2015YrEnd.pdf.
20. Rodger Jones, So far this year in Texas, number of death sentences = zero, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS: OPINION BLOG, (July 2, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://dallasmorningviewsblog.dal
lasnews.com/2015/07/so-far-this-year-in-texas-number-of-death-sentences-zero.html/.
21. Eric Nicholson, Texas Falls Out of Love with the Death Penalty, Embraces Life Without
Parole, DALLAS OBSERVER (Dec. 17. 2005, 4:00 AM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/
news/crime-law/where-is-the-texas-death-row-class-of-99-now/nnWQw/.
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predict,22 or whether most of the countries and states “likely to em-
brace the abolitionist cause” have already done so.23
The retention of capital punishment in Japan is puzzling in sev-
eral respects. Japan and the United States are the only two
developed democracies that retain capital punishment and con-
tinue to carry out executions on a regular basis. Other rich and
democratic countries have abolished the death penalty in law (Ca-
nada, Australia, New Zealand, and all the countries of Europe
except Belarus)24 or practice (South Korea and the special adminis-
trative region of Hong Kong).25 Japan does not have radically local
democracy, which has made abolition difficult in the United States,
nor does it have a history of race relations like that which has
shaped the death penalty in the United States.26 Conversely, Japan’s
governmental structure shares many of the characteristics that ex-
plain capital punishment abolition in European countries such as
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. These characteristics
include a centralized state, a uniform penal code, a multi-party par-
liamentary system which insulates representatives from public
opinion, and a civil law system with bureaucratic professionalization
of judges and prosecutors.27 Yet despite these similarities, Japan’s
death penalty has not moved towards abolitionist Europe in policy
or practice.
The puzzle of Japanese retention deepens when one considers
the two main political circumstances which precipitated abolition
in Western Europe after World War II; similar circumstances are
also found in recent Japanese history. In Germany, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain, the fall of an authoritarian leader (Hitler, Mussolini,
Salazar, and Franco) led to death penalty abolition in 1944, 1949,
1976, and 1978, respectively.28 But after Japan’s authoritarian politi-
cal system collapsed in 1945, the death penalty did not disappear.
Similarly, in Austria, Great Britain, and France, the election of a
22. William A. Schabas, Universal Abolition of Capital Punishment is Drawing Nearer, 6 INT’L
AFF. F. 12, 13 (2015).
23. LEON RADZINOWICZ, ADVENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1999).
24. See James Crisp, Belarus and Ukrainian rebels keep death penalty alive in Europe, EURAC-
TIV.COM (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/belarus-and-
ukrainan-rebels-keep-death-penalty-alive-in-europe/.
25. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 147–90 (describing the cessation of executions
in South Korea since 1997); id. at 365-77 (describing Hong Kong, where the last execution
occurred in 1966 and where capital punishment was abolished in 1993, though residents of
the Special Administrative Region can still be condemned to death and executed in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China through the process of rendition).
26. Compare GARLAND, supra note 7 (discussing how race shapes capital punishment in
America).
27. See HAMMEL, supra note 8, at 233.
28. See ZIMRING, supra note 8, at 23.
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left-liberal government led to abolition of capital punishment in
1950, 1965, and 1981, respectively.29 Yet after the left-liberal Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control of Japan’s central
government in 2009, the death penalty was neither abolished nor
significantly reformed.
Japanese retention also seems strange in light of two social facts
connected to capital punishment in studies of the United States.
First, Japan’s homicide rate of approximately 0.6 per 100,000 popu-
lation is approximately one-tenth of the United States’ homicide
rate, and is lower than the homicide rates in many abolitionist
countries of the European Union.30 In transatlantic comparisons,
the high murder rate in the United States has been used to explain
why America retains the death penalty while European nations do
not. On this theory, “the fear, grief, and outrage” that murder in-
spires and that fuel public support for state killing “are far more
prevalent” in the United States, where murder is far more com-
mon.31 Yet this logic cannot explain retention in Japan, which has
consistently had one of the lowest homicide rates in the world.32
The second puzzling social fact concerns economic inequality,
which grew after Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1990.33 In most
respects, however, Japanese society remains much less unequal than
America,34 where economic, racial, and social disparities help ex-
plain retention of the death penalty, the number of capital
sentences, and the number of executions.35 Japan is like most other
death penalty nations in that the people most likely to be con-
demned to death and executed are poor and poorly connected,36
but inequality does not seem to explain the failure of abolition in
Japan.
29. Id.
30. See David T.  Johnson, The Vanishing Killer: Japan’s Postwar Homicide Decline, 9 SOC. SCI.
JAPAN J. 73, 77 (2006) (reporting that in the late 1990s, homicide rates in Europe varied from
0.7 in France to 2.2 in Finland).
31. SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH
THE DEATH PENALTY 42 (2003).
32. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 73.
33. See generally TOSHIAKI TACHIBANAKI, CONFRONTING INCOME INEQUALITY IN JAPAN: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (2009).
34. See id. at 242–43.
35. See generally David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, Ideology, Social Threat, and Death
Sentences: Capital Sentencing Across Time and Space, 83 SOC. FORCES 249 (2004); David Jacobs &
Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67
AM. SOC. REV. 109 (2002); David Jacobs et al., Vigilantism, Current Racial Threat, and Death
Sentences, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 656 (2005); David Jacobs & Stephanie L. Kent, The Determinants of
Executions Since 1951: How Politics, Protests, Public Opinion, and Social Divisions Shape Capital
Punishment, 54 SOC. PROBS. 297 (2007).
36. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 307.
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What, then, explains the absence of abolition in Japan? Few seri-
ous studies address this question, but parallel studies of the failure
of abolition in the United States suggest that there are multiple
causes.37 The most persuasive explanation of the death penalty’s
trajectory in Western countries focuses on “state institutions and the
political and cultural processes that bear on state action.”38 In this
view, the death penalty “is always and everywhere an exercise of state
power,” and it is the “the nature of the state and its context of ac-
tion” that dictates stability and change in a death penalty system.39
Focusing on the state’s role when explaining capital punishment’s
trajectory produces three insights about the puzzle of Japanese
retention.
First, Japan still has the death penalty partly because it missed a
prime opportunity for abolition during the postwar Occupation
(1945-1952).40 As described above, several European nations abol-
ished the death penalty soon after authoritarian regimes fell.41
Similar abolitions have occurred in Asia as well: in Cambodia after
the fall of the Khmer Rouge (1989), in the Philippines after Marcos
fled (1987), and in East Timor after it gained independence from
Indonesia (1999).42 In all of these countries, abolition was a way of
symbolically distancing new governments from the state killing per-
formed by their predecessors.43 Japan experienced major regime
change after 1945, yet the death penalty endured throughout the
subsequent process of state transformation. The reform agenda in
the United States-led occupation of Japan was highly ambitious, but
capital punishment was not on it. This not only distinguishes the
occupation of Japan from the parallel occupation of Germany,44
but also helps explain why Japan remains retentionist today. The
Tokyo War Crimes Trial is a key part of Japan’s retentionist story
(seven war criminals were executed in 1948 under American offi-
cials).45 When a country is defeated in war, the victor’s desire to
37. See Temkin, supra note 8.
38. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 127 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 127–28 (emphases added).
40. David T. Johnson, Where the State Kills in Secret: Capital Punishment in Japan, 8 PUNISH-
MENT & SOC’Y 251, 259 (2006).
41. See ZIMRING, supra note 8, at 19.
42. See JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 16.
43. See ZIMRING, supra note 8, at 22–23.
44. RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY 1600-
1987, at 739–871 (1996).
45. See YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II (2009), though a detailed account of why capital punishment en-
dured through a period when much else in Japanese society was changing—and in
circumstances that have precipitated abolition in many other nations—has never been pub-
lished; RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS’ JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 172 (1971).
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exact revenge against leaders of the losing regime may cause capital
punishment to become more entrenched than it otherwise would
be.46 Saddam Hussein’s hanging in 2006 and the subsequent resur-
gence of executions in Iraq illustrate the contemporary relevance of
this possibility.47
Second, the persistence of capital punishment in Japan after the
occupation ended in 1952 can be explained by the long hegemony
of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other polit-
ical parties’ inability to change death penalty policy and practice
when they controlled government.48 The LDP gained control of Ja-
pan’s central government in 1955, and over the following sixty years
it maintained control for all but fifty months. The first interregnum
lasted only eight months in 1993-94, and the coalition government
of seven parties was too fractious and too brief to enable reform of
capital punishment – or much else.49 The second interruption of
long-term LDP rule began in August 2009, when the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) gained control of the central government; the
DPJ retained control until it lost power to the LDP following a land-
slide election in December 2012.50 Despite promises to proceed
more cautiously with capital punishment than the LDP had done,
the DPJ did not move towards abolition or a moratorium on execu-
tions during this period.51
European experience suggests that abolition is more likely to oc-
cur under the leadership of a liberal party than a conservative one,
as Austria, Great Britain, and France demonstrated, and the same
can be said of moratoria on executions in South Korea and Tai-
wan.52 In the United States, abolition at the state level rarely
occurred in conservative strongholds, although in 2015 Nebraska
became the first predominantly Republican state to abolish the
death penalty in forty years.53 The durability of Japan’s death pen-
alty reflects not only the long-term hegemony of its ruling party, but
46. See MINEAR, supra note 45, at 173.
47. See UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE & OFFICE
OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN IRAQ (2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HRO_DP_1Oct2014.pdf.
48. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 81.
49. GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 99–136 (1999).
50. Kenji E. Kushida & Phillip Y. Lipscy, The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan,
in JAPAN UNDER THE DPJ: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION AND GOVERNANCE 3-4 (Kenji E. Kushida
& Phillip Y. Lipscy eds., 2013).
51. Id. at 22–24.
52. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 93.
53. See Grant Schulte & Anna Gronewald, Nebraska Abolishes Death Penalty in Landmark
Override Vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 28, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
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also that other parties that have held power were almost “indistin-
guishable” from the conservative LDP in policy preferences and
commitments.54 In Japan, as in other countries, conservative politics
has contributed to the conservation of capital punishment.
When examining the state’s role in retaining capital punishment,
the third insight stresses the Japanese state’s geopolitical position,
especially in the years after 1980, when Japan emerged as an eco-
nomic power. Like the United States, China, and India, Japan has
sufficient size, economic clout, and political importance to make it
difficult for external forces—international law, human rights
norms, United Nations resolutions, or the lobbying of abolitionist
activists —to impose meaningful sanctions for noncompliance.
Powerful states seldom cede to supranational entities.55 Rather, they
tend to only endorse international norms that serve their own pur-
poses. There are many examples of this selectivity: the United States
and torture in its war on terror, China and freedom of expression,
Japan and whaling, India and caste-based discrimination, and capi-
tal punishment retention in all four of these countries. It is more
difficult for the “human rights dynamic” that has been driving abo-
lition in many parts of the world56 to influence death penalty policy
and practice in these global powers than it is for the same dynamic
to have an effect in Fiji, Madagascar, or Suriname, three countries
that abolished after December 2014.57
In some respects, Japan remains committed to a model of law
and government that considers self-sufficiency a virtue and that re-
sists and resents attempts at outside influence.58 The Liberal
Democratic Party, which believes “human rights are not univer-
sal,”59 rules Japan, yet Japan often follows America’s lead in matters
of foreign policy and human rights.60 In these spheres, Japan’s sub-
ordination to the U.S. is sometimes so extreme that it has been
d41ae74bd2954099aa875375e23554bb/nebraska-abolishes-death-penalty-landmark-override-
vote.
54. Arthur Stockwin, Japanese Politics: Mainstream or Exotic?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CON-
TEMPORARY JAPAN, supra note 13, at 15–22.
55. See, e.g., AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
56. Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The Impact of a
“New Dynamic,” 38 CRIME & JUST. 1, 3–4 (2009).
57. On the way out—with grisly exceptions, supra note 17.
58. Cf. Sangmin Bae, International Norms, Domestic Politics, and the Death Penalty: Comparing
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, 44 COMP. POL. 41, 55 (2011).
59. Lawrence Repeta, Limiting Fundamental Rights Protection: The Role of the Supreme Court,
in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, supra note 13, at 49.
60. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERI-
CAN EMPIRE (2000) (providing examples related to foreign policy, especially chapter 2 and
chapter 8); KENNETH PYLE, JAPAN RISING: THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE POWER AND PURPOSE
(2007) (providing examples related to foreign policy, especially chapter 8).
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called a “puppet state.”61 Japan’s continued capital punishment may
also depend on American retention. When a superpower that sees
itself as “the archetypal liberal democracy and guardian of human
rights,” such as the United States, kills its own citizens, it provides
cover and legitimacy for other nations that want to do the same.62 If
the United States abolishes capital punishment, as some analysts
predict,63 Japan may resist pressure to conform to the abolitionist
norm; Japan’s resistance with respect to whaling, ever since the In-
ternational Whaling Commission’s moratorium on commercial
whaling went into effect in 1987,64 demonstrates its willingness to
resist conforming. But Japan’s response to United States abolition
would more likely be to do what it has often done in its modern
history: adapt to the changing imperatives of its external environ-
ment.65 Japanese leaders currently perceive little pressure to
conform to the emerging norm of abolition; Asia, unlike Europe,
has no regional organizations to push Japan (or China, Taiwan, or
Thailand) towards abolition, as the European Union and the Coun-
cil of Europe did to several countries in Central and Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.66 In the geopolitics of capi-
tal punishment, Asia is not Europe, and Japan is not Latvia or
Lithuania.67
II. JAPANESE REFORM
The preceding Part argues that Japan is retentionist “in its own
way,” largely for reasons related to the state and the contexts of
state action in the postwar period. This Part further illustrates the
relevance of the Karenina principle by arguing that capital punish-
ment in Japan, in addition to being retentionist, is also reformist “in
61. GAVAN MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE: JAPAN IN THE AMERICAN EMBRACE 2 (2007).
62. Roger Hood, Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 331
(2001).
63. See generally THE ROAD TO ABOLITION? (Charles J. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds.,
2009); IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Austin Sarat &
Jurgen Martschukat eds., 2011).
64. HIROYUKI WATANABE, JAPAN’S WHALING: THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE xiv (2009).
65. PYLE, supra note 60, at 9.
66. Eva Puhar, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Central and Eastern Europe: A
Survey of Abolition Processes in Former Communist Countries, (2003) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, National University of Ireland).
67. David T. Johnson, Why Does Japan Retain the Death Penalty? Nine Hypotheses, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 139–57 (Lill Scherdin
ed., 2014).
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its own way.” The most striking reform-related fact is the dearth of
death penalty change.
The contrast between Japan and the United States is stark. Public
support for capital punishment in the United States has declined to
its lowest levels since the 1960s.68 Several American states have de-
clared moratoria on executions. The U.S. Supreme Court has
prohibited executing the intellectually disabled69 and minors con-
victed of murder who were under eighteen at the time of the
crime.70 There have been numerous political and legal struggles
over the method of execution—and much experimentation with
the chemicals used to perform lethal injections.71 Death penalty
sentencing in the United States has declined 75 percent since 1990,
and executions have declined 60 percent. The declines in death
sentences and executions have several causes, including a large de-
crease in homicides and the increased use of life-without-parole
sentencing alternatives.72 But the most important cause appears to
be anxiety about mistakes in the U.S. capital punishment adminis-
tration.73 Concerns about wrongful convictions and other
miscarriages of justice have made prosecutors, judges, juries, and
governors more cautious about capital punishment.74
68. On public opinion and capital punishment in America, see Public Opinion About the
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/public-opin-
ion-about-death-penalty; on public opinion and capital punishment in Japan, see MAI SATO,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN: WILL THE PUBLIC TOLERATE ABOLITION? 189-93 (2014) (arguing
that the support for capital punishment found in government surveys is softer than press
reports suggest and concluding that the Japanese public would likely accept abolition); Mai
Sato & Paul Bacon, THE PUBLIC OPINION MYTH: WHY JAPAN RETAINS THE DEATH PENALTY 44
(2015), http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/The-Public-
Opinion-Myth.pdf (arguing that the Japanese public is more discerning about capital punish-
ment than the results of superficial surveys suggest and that they are, in fact, “largely ready
for abolition”).
69. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
70. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
71. TUROW, supra note 31, at 20; David Von Drehle, The Last Execution: Why the Era of
Capital Punishment is Ending, TIME, June 8, 2015, at 27.
72. David G. Savage, Capital Punishment in U.S. Continues Its Decline, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17,
2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-death-penalty-20141218-story.html.
73. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND
THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE (2008).
74. See generally NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015 (2016), http:/
/www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf; ALLISON
D. REDLICH ET AL., EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD
(2014). Recent reforms in American criminal justice (such as cutting back on mandatory
minimum sentences, limiting solitary confinement, reducing barriers to reentry for ex-in-
mates, and so on) have been driven partly by a push from political conservatives such as U.S.
Representative Patrick J. Nolan of California and former Chief Justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court Isaac Beverly Lake, Jr. See Bill Keller, Prison Revolt, THE NEW YORKER (June 29,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/prison-revolt; Japan has seen no
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It is sometimes claimed that Japan “rarely” uses capital punish-
ment.75 In reality, Japan looks similar to the United States in its
inclination to use death as a criminal sanction. In per capita terms,
Japan’s execution rate is lower than the overall rate for the United
States and lower than the rates in high-rate American states such as
Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia.76 But the per capita execution rate
can be a misleading measure to determine frequency of use be-
cause (Stalinist nightmares aside) persons are not randomly
selected for death. They are convicted and executed from a larger
pool of potentially capital cases. The pool in the United States and
Japan consists entirely of homicide crimes.77 Thus, to assess the
scale of capital punishment prevalence in these two countries, one
must consider the size of the relevant capital-crime pools. The size
of America’s murder pool has declined by almost half since 1990,78
but in per capita terms it remains about ten times larger than Ja-
pan’s murder pool. A recent study found that about 2.2 percent of
all known murder offenders were sentenced to death in the United
States from 1977 through 1999.79 By state, the range ran from a low
of 0.4 percent in Colorado to a high of six percent in Nevada.80 The
probability of a known murderer being sentenced to death in Japan
is not much different. From 1994 through 2003, Japan sentenced
ninety-three persons to death, with approximately 7000 murders oc-
curring in Japan during that period.81 The chance of a murderer
being sentenced to death was 1.3 percent—about the same rate as
in California and Virginia.82 And in 2007, when Japan had fourteen
death sentences in courts of original jurisdiction and the United
States had 110, the ratio of death sentences to homicides was about
three times higher in Japan than in the United States.83
In short, when it comes to the probability of imposing a sentence
of death, Japan looks like many American death penalty states.
When it comes to execution, Japan is even more aggressive than the
United States, where more than two-thirds of death sentences are
parallel push for criminal justice or capital punishment reform from the LDP, the country’s
conservative ruling party.
75. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 338.
76. David T. Johnson, American Capital Punishment in Comparative Perspective, 36 L. & SOC.




80. John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 (2004).
81. Johnson, supra note 76, at 1052.
82. Blume et al., supra note 80.
83. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 77.
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overturned on appeal.84 In Japan, by contrast, most persons who
receive a sentence of death are eventually executed.85 In these ways,
Japan is not “relatively sparing” in its capital punishment usage, as
some analysts contend.86 It can be called a “vigorous killing state,”87
and in some respects its use of capital punishment has been surging
since 1993.88
By comparison to the United States, there has been much more
continuity than change in Japan’s death penalty policy and prac-
tice. My analysis starts with a summary of the modest changes that
have occurred in recent years.
In 2009, Japan implemented a new trial system in which six
laypersons sit with three professional judges to adjudicate guilt and
determine sentences in serious criminal cases.89 This “lay judge sys-
tem” (saiban-in seido) places citizen participation at the center of
Japanese criminal trials—and criminal justice—for the first time
since 1943, when the Jury Act of 1928 was suspended after fifteen
years.90 The lay judge reform has stimulated reform in several parts
of Japan’s pretrial process, from recording interrogations and ex-
panding discovery rights for defendants to relaxing bail policy and
invigorating the criminal defense system.91 Since the lay judge re-
form took effect, all murder defendants have been tried by lay
judge tribunals.92 Formally, this is a major change from the previous
practice in which murder defendants were tried by a panel of three
professional judges.
In terms of trial outcomes, however, the continuities between the
old and new trial systems are striking. Under the new trial system,
84. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES 1973-1995
i–iii (2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_final.
pdf.
85. Johnson, supra note 76.
86. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 319.
87. Johnson, supra note 40, at 267.
88. The main signs of resurgence in Japanese capital punishment are increases in the
number of death sentences, executions, and condemned persons on death row, and in-
creased public support for capital punishment in government surveys. See JOHNSON &
ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 69–78.
89. DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE, JURIES IN THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CONTINUING STRUG-
GLE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2015).
90. Id.
91. Satoru Shinomiya, Saiban’inho wa Keiji Jitsumu no Genba ni Nani o Motarashite Iru ka
[What Is the Lay Judge Act Doing to Criminal Justice Practice?], 644 HOGAKU SEMINA [JURISPRU-
DENCE SEMINAR] 1, 1–3 (August 2008).
92. See David T. Johnson, Japan’s Lay Judge System, in HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE (Jacqueline Ross & Stephen Thaman eds., forthcoming 2016).
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Japan’s famously (and notoriously) high conviction rate has not de-
clined.93 Under the new trial system, lay judge panels are at least as
likely to impose a death sentence when prosecutors seek one as pro-
fessional judges were in the previous trial system. Under the new
trial system, lay judge panels impose a death sentence in approxi-
mately seventy percent of the cases where prosecutors seek one.94
This seventy percent rate is also higher than the rates that prevail in
American death penalty jurisdictions. Sentencing severity for other
crimes has changed little under the new trial system, except in seri-
ous sex crime cases, where sentences have become somewhat
harsher.95
In addition to the lay judge reform, three other death penalty
changes occurred while the Democratic Party of Japan ruled the
country from 2009 to 2012. All are modest, and none has had a
significant effect on the number of death sentences or executions
or on the way in which capital punishment is administered.
First, Minister of Justice Keiko Chiba, an avowed opponent of
capital punishment, attended two hangings in Tokyo on July 28,
2010.96 Before that day, no sitting Minister of Justice had attended a
hanging for several decades.97 Minister Chiba watched these two ex-
ecutions—of Shinogawa Kazuo (age 59) and Ogata Hidenori (age
33)—at her own discretion because she wanted to witness firsthand
the executions she had authorized.98 Customarily, the only persons
who observe hangings in Japan are a prosecutor, a prosecutor’s as-
sistant, the warden of the jail where the hangings are held, and
several members of the jail’s execution team.99 From an American
93. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 214
(2002).
94. SATORU SHINOMIYA, NIHON NI OKERU SHIKEI RYO¯KEI NI TSUITE: SONO KO¯SEISEI,
RINRISEI, SOSHITE KEMPo¯tekigo¯sei [ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR DEATH SENTENCING IN JAPAN:
FAIRNESS, ETHICS, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY] 775–77 (2014).
95. Takeda Masahiro, Kensatsu wa Taisho¯ Jiken o Shincho¯ni Kiso: Saiban’in Ko¯hosha no Jitair-
itsu, 60% o Koeru [Prosecutors are Charging Lay Judge Cases Cautiously: And the No-Show Rate for
Lay Judge Candidates Exceeds 60 Percent], JAˆNARIZUMU [JOURNALISM] 136, 136–43 (2014).
96. Keiko Chiba, Shikko no Shomei wa Watashi Nari no Koishi: Shikei – Nayami Fukaki Mori [I
Signed the Execution Orders ‘to Throw a Pebble into a Pond’ in My Own Fasion: Death
Penalty . . . The Deep Wood of Woe], ASAHI SHIMBUN [ASAHI NEWSPAPER], Nov. 20, 2011, at
19.
97. Keiko Chiba wrote about her decision to authorize and attend the executions in
Shikko no Shomei wa Watashi Nari no Koishi: Shikei – Nayami Fukaki Mori, supra note 96. For an
extended interview of Chiba on the same subjects, see the NHK documentary ETV Tokushuˆ
Shikei Shikko¯: Ho¯mudaijin no Kunou [ETV Documentary Special Execution: Suffering of Minister of
Justice] (ETV television broadcast Feb. 27, 2011).
98. David T. Johnson, Progress and Problems in Japanese Capital Punishment, in CON-
FRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 170
(Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013).
99. Johnson, supra note 40, at 254.
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perspective, hangings in Japan are most notable for who is not pre-
sent: there are no journalists, there are no scholars, and there are
no friends, family, or relatives of the condemned or of the victim.
As of 2015, Japan remains “the state that kills in secret.”100
Second, shortly after Minister of Justice Chiba watched the hang-
ings in 2010, she gave a handful of carefully chosen journalists from
one of Japan’s conservative press club access to the gallows in To-
kyo.101 This was the first time in half a century that reporters were
permitted to view one of the seven locations where hangings are
carried out in Japan.102 The Japanese media discussed this show-
and-tell, but the meaning of this “opening” is minimal: viewing the
gallows when no one is being hanged provides as much insight into
the execution process as allowing admission to the Tokyo Dome
when no baseball game is being played.103 On this occasion, elite
journalists collaborated with high-ranking prosecutors to “stage-
manage a difficult story about an uncomfortably controversial is-
sue.”104 This is part of a larger Japanese pattern where mainstream
reporters “shun critical stories” about capital punishment, war
crimes, the imperial family, and other sensitive issues.105
Third, Minister of Justice Chiba ordered the creation of a death
penalty study group.106 Chiba charged the group with examining
Japan’s death penalty from various perspectives to discern what
should be maintained or changed.107 In the end, however, nothing
changed. The study group met monthly for about two years. Its
meetings were closed to the public, and insiders reported that dis-
cussions were scripted and controlled by prosecutors in the Ministry
of Justice who constituted the study group’s secretariat.108 In Japa-
nese criminal justice, ratifying the status quo is often a central
function of study groups and reform commissions.109 The most re-
cent illustration of this tendency occurred in 2014 and 2015 when
100. Id. at 267.
101. Johnson, supra note 98, at 170.
102. Hanging has been the only method of execution in Japan since the 1870s. See DANIEL
V. BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 152 (2005).
103. Johnson, supra note 98, at 170.
104. David McNeill, Japan’s Contemporary Media, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JA-
PAN, supra note 13, at 68.
105. Id. at 64.
106. The Ministry of Justice death penalty study team’s report can be found at SHIKEI NO
ARIKATA NI TSUITE NO BENKYO¯KAI [DEATH PENALTY STUDY TEAM], TORIMATOME HO¯KOKUSHO
[SUMMARIZED FINAL REPORT] (2012), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000096631.pdf.
107. See id.
108. Johnson, supra note 98, at 170–171.
109. MASAYUKI SUO, SORE DE MO BOKU WA KAIGI DE TATAKAU: DOKYUMENTO KEIJI SHIHO
KAIKAKU [EVEN SO, I WILL STRUGGLE ON THE COMMITTEE: DOCUMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM] 3–9, 221–26 (2015).
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Japan established a “Special Subcommittee for a Criminal Justice
System for a New Era.”110 The Subcommittee issued remarkably
modest recommendations for criminal justice reform after a high-
profile scandal involving prosecutor misconduct (forging floppy
disk evidence) and the acquittal of a high-level bureaucrat (Muraki
Atsuko) created pressure to do something about longstanding
problems in Japan’s approach to criminal interrogation.111 The
most fundamental reason reform failed was because the subcom-
mittee was stacked with conservative members who supported the
efforts of prosecutors and police to preserve the status quo.112 Ironi-
cally, the subcommittee’s main reform recommendations suggested
changes in Japanese criminal justice that would expand the powers
of the law enforcement institutions whose misconduct stimulated
the reform process in the first place—a requirement to video re-
cord approximately three percent of all interrogations combined
with broader authority for police and prosecutors to wiretap and
new authority for prosecutors to plea bargain.113
Compared to these modest changes in Japanese capital punish-
ment and criminal justice, the continuities are numerous and
significant. There has been no decline in the propensity to con-
demn murder defendants to the gallows since 2009—contrary to
what some analysts predicted before the lay judge reform took ef-
fect.114 Japan has not abolished capital punishment in Japan since
its last abolition ended more than a millennium ago in 810 C.E.
That abolition, which lasted about 350 years, seems to have been
enabled by two social conditions: the peace Japan enjoyed during
the Heian period, and the flourishing of Buddhism, which arrived
in Japan from China in the sixth century.115 The Heian abolition
was preceded by another abolition starting in 724, at the beginning
of the reign of Emperor Shomo, which lasted “only for a few
years.”116 In postwar Japan, there have been no moratoria on execu-
tions since the last (unofficial) one ended in March 1993.
Prompted by public and prosecutorial concern about four con-
demned inmates who were exonerated in the 1980s after spending
a combined total of 123 years on death row for murders they did
110. Id.
111. Johnson, supra note 93, at 243–75.
112. Masayuki, supra note 109.
113. Id.
114. Tokushu: Saiban’in Seido – Shikei o Kudasu no wa Dare ka [Special Focus: The Lay Judge
System: Who Will Impose Death Sentences?], 36 GENDAI SHISO [MODERN THOUGHTS] 27, 27–245
(2008).
115. SHIGEMITSU DANDO, SHIKEI HAISHIRON [THEORY OF THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT] 493 (Yuhikaku 6th ed. 2000).
116. See MARIO MARAZZITI, 13 WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE DEATH PENALTY 72 (2015).
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not commit, the moratorium began in November 1989 and lasted
for forty months.117 Between 1993, when executions resumed, and
the end of 2014, Japan hanged at least one inmate every year except
2011, the last full year that the Democratic Party of Japan ruled the
country. During this twenty-two-year period, the average number of
executions per year was 4.6, with a high of fifteen in 2008.118 In the
last five years for which evidence is available (2010–2014), eleven of
the twenty persons hanged in Japan were over age fifty at the time
they were marched to the gallows, and six of those eleven were over
age sixty. On Christmas Day in 2007, four Japanese men were
hanged. Their ages were forty-four, sixty-four, sixty-five, and sev-
enty-seven. Japan may well have the most elderly death row
population in the world, for two main reasons: because a relatively
small proportion of homicides in the country are committed by
young people,119 and because usually there is a long delay between
death sentence imposition and execution.120Another Japanese capi-
tal punishment distinction further reflects a continuing
commitment to this institution: in an era when death row popula-
tions in many countries and many U.S. states are declining, Japan’s
has grown from fifty-six in 1993 to 135 in 2012—an increase of 140
percent in twenty years.121
There are four additional features of continuity in Japanese capi-
tal punishment. First, and unlike every U.S. death penalty state
(and every U.S. state except Alaska), Japan does not have a life-
without-parole sanction.122 In the United States, the availability of
the LWOP sanction has given prosecutors and courts an extremely
severe alternative to a death sentence; this has helped drive down
the number of death sentences in many jurisdictions, including the
formerly high use counties of Harris (Houston), Oklahoma
117. Daniel H. Foote, Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11 (1992);
Johnson, supra note 40, at 262.
118. NENPO¯ SHIKEI HAISHI HENSHUˆ IINKAI [EDITORIAL BOARD FOR ANNUAL REPORT FOR ABO-
LITION OF DEATH PENALTY] NENPO¯ SHIKEI HAISHI 2014: HAKAMADA SAISHIN KARA SHIKEI HAISHI
E [2014 ANNUAL REPORT FOR ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALY: FROM NEW TRIAL OF HAKAMADA
CASE TO ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY] 219 (2014).
119. Johnson, supra note 30, at 78.
120. The long delays between death sentence and execution have two main causes: in-
mate appeals to one of the country’s eight High Courts and then to the Supreme Court, each
of which may take several years to conclude, and a norm in Japan’s Ministry of Justice not to
seek execution warrants for the half or so of death row inmates who have petitioned for a
retrial (as of October 2015, 128 persons were on death row). See JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra
note 14, at 87; Nathan Shiga, 128 Convicts on Death Row Live On in Japan, ZAIKEI NEWS (Oct. 3,
2015), http://www.zaikeinews.com/articles/746/20151003/128-convicts-death-row-live.htm.
121. NENPO¯ SHIKEI HAISHI HENSHUˆ IINKAI, supra note 118, at 217.
122. Cf. Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/life-without-parole (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
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(Oklahoma City), and Philadelphia.123 There have been a few at-
tempts to introduce bills in Japan that would create an LWOP or
LWOP-like sentence.124 These bills, however, have never gone to a
Parliamentary vote, partly because of opposition from prosecutors
and other proponents of capital punishment who fear that the
availability of this harsh alternative sentence would mean less use of
the ultimate penalty.125
Second, there have been no decisions by Japan’s Supreme Court
analogous to those by the U.S. Supreme Court that have narrowed
the scope of capital punishment for juveniles and the intellectually
disabled. Japan’s Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment on several occasions in the postwar period
and has, with few exceptions, upheld the death sentences it has
been asked to review on appeal.126 Moreover, the norm on Japan’s
Supreme Court is to discourage dissenting opinions in capital cases
that might suggest problems in Japan’s death penalty administra-
tion.127 This is a problem because societies need dissent, and so do
Supreme Courts and systems of capital punishment.128 Without it,
problems are more likely to persist, and progressive change is less
likely to occur.129
Third, there has been no change in Japan’s execution method
since hanging became the only means of execution more than a
century ago. Even the design of Japan’s gallows remains much as it
was in the Meiji era (1868-1912).130 In the United States, by con-
trast, there have been several changes in execution method,
123. See Simone Seiver, Why Three Counties that Loved the Death Penalty Have Almost Stopped
Pursuing It: A Closer Look at Get-Tough DAs, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 11, 2015, 1:09 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/11/why-three-counties-that-loved-the-death-
penalty-have-almost-stopped-pursuing-it.
124. David T. Johnson, Shiten [Opinion], Shuˆshinkei Do¯nyuˆ: Shikei Yokushi ni wa Chokketsu
Sezu [Life Without Parole Is Not Directly Connected to the Death Penalty], ASAHI SHIMBUN [ASHAHI
NEWSPAPER], June 20, 2008, at 14.
125. MIKIO KAWAI, SHUSHINKEI NO SHIKAKU [DEAD PERSPECTIVES ON LIFE SENTENCES]
(2009).
126. KENJI NAGATA, SHIKEI SENTAKU KIJUN NO KENKYUˆ [RESEARCH ON SENTENCING STAN-
DARDS FOR DEATH PENALTY] (2010).
127. SUSUMU YAMAGUCHI & YU MIYAJI, SAIKO¯SAI NO ANTO¯: SHO¯SUˆ IKEN GA JIDAI O
KIRIHIRAKU [SECRET BATTLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT: DISSENTING OPINIONS WILL OPEN UP
A NEW ERA] 51 (2011).
128. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
129. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 97–99 (2015).
130. NAKAGAWA TOMOMASA BENGO DAN, KO¯SHUKEI WA ZANGYAKU NA KEIBATSU DE WA NAI-
NOKA? SHINBUN TO HO¯IGAKU GA KATARU SHINJITSU [ISN’T HANGING A CRUEL CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT? THE TRUTH TOLD BY NEWSPAPERS AND MEDICAL FORENSICS] (2011); KENJI
NAGATA, GHQ Bunsho ga Kataru Nihon no Shikei Shikko¯ Ko¯bunsho kara Semaru Ko¯shukei
no Jittai [The Administration of Executions in Japan as Told by GHQ Documents: Approach-
ing the Reality of Hanging from Public Records] (2013).
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advancing from hanging to electrocution to the gas chamber to va-
rious types of lethal injection.131 The U.S. changes have not
produced many abolitions or moratoria, but the proximate causes
of change (botched executions especially) have stimulated many re-
form discussions and some reform.132
Fourth, public support for capital punishment in Japan has not
softened as it has in the United States. In fact, support for capital
punishment in Japan has been increasing for about twenty years,
though it did take a small dip in November 2014.133 Even with that
dip, more than eighty percent of respondents said that having the
death penalty is “unavoidable,” while less than ten percent said that
it should be abolished (the latter figure is a rise of four percentage
points since the previous poll in 2009).134  Japan’s death penalty
surveys are methodologically flawed, for the questions are leading
and simplistic and the samples are not random.135 Survey results
also find firmer support for capital punishment than more nuanced
measures suggest.136 When Japanese citizens assess the propriety of
capital punishment in the context of particular cases and with a
choice set that includes harsh alternative sanctions (such as life im-
prisonment), their support softens—some.137 But even when these
more sophisticated measures are employed, public support for capi-
tal punishment remains strong.138 In a democracy, this form of
continuity in capital punishment can be fundamental. The stability
in public support over time is partly explained by the secrecy that
surrounds capital punishment in Japan, which makes the death
penalty a low salience issue,139 and by media reporting about capital
punishment characterized by the themes of avoidance and
ambivalence.140
131. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH
PENALTY (Stanford University Press 2014).
132. Id. at 146.
133. Sato & Bacon, supra note 68, at 17–20.
134. Takuya Kitazawa, Slight Drop Seen for First Time in Japanese who Support Capital Punish-
ment, ASIA & JAPAN WATCH (Jan. 25, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/soci
al_affairs/AJ201501250038[https://web.archive.org/web/20151008013332/http://ajw.
asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201501250038].
135. SATO, supra note 68, at 63–76; Sato & Bacon, supra note 68.
136. SATO, supra note 68, at 105–80.
137. Id. at 165, 179.
138. Id.
139. See generally Johnson, supra note 40 (arguing that the secrecy surrounding capital
punishment in Japan lowers the salience of the issue).
140. See Mari Kita & David T. Johnson, Framing Capital Punishment in Japan: Avoidance,
Ambivalence, and Atonement, 9 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 221, 229–33 (2014) (concluding that Jap-
anese newspaper’s focus on atonement leads to attitudes of avoidance and ambivalence
about the death penalty).
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III. EXPLAINING JAPANESE CONTINUITY
The causes of continuity in Japanese capital punishment have
not been the subject of much study, but some parts of the puzzle
seem clear. This Part summarizes four ways in which capital punish-
ment in Japan differs from capital punishment in the United States
and thereby helps explain the dearth of death penalty reform in
Japan. Section A discusses the infrequency with which wrongful
convictions are revealed in Japan; Section B analyzes the jurispru-
dence of Japanese capital punishment, which rejects the premise
that “death is different” from other kinds of criminal punishment;
Section C examines the secrecy which surrounds Japanese capital
sentencing and executions; and Section D considers the relative ra-
cial homogeneity of Japanese society.
A. Wrongful Convictions Are Rarely Revealed
The United States has been the subject of more wrongful convic-
tion research than any country in the world. In the quarter century
or so since 1989, more than 1400 persons have been released from
prison because of evidence of their innocence.141 This is about 4.5
exonerations per month, or one per week every week for the past
twenty-five years. About three-quarters of these victims were wrongly
convicted of homicide or sexual assault—crimes which tend to
leave physical evidence behind and which tend to attract more me-
dia attention than other offenses.142 Less than one quarter of
exonerees were cleared based on DNA evidence; in the United
States, biological evidence (saliva, semen, blood, and the like) is
available in only ten to fifteen percent of all serious felony cases.143
All wrongful convictions are tragic, but the most worrisome are
those that result in a mistaken sentence of death. Between 1973 and
July 2015, 154 persons in twenty-six American states were released
from death row because of evidence of their innocence (DPIC).
More than half of these exonerations occurred in just five states:
Florida (twenty-five), Illinois (twenty), Texas (thirteen), Oklahoma
(ten), and Louisiana (ten).144 The true size of America’s wrongful
141. See Exonerations Map, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2016).
142. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 228 (2012).
143. Id.
144. Fact Sheet, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/docu-
ments/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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conviction problem is even bigger than these figures suggest, be-
cause an unknown number of wrongly convicted persons are never
discovered and exonerated. Studies suggest that approximately four
percent of persons convicted in capital homicide cases are wrong-
fully convicted,145 and one analyst believes the rate could be as high
as one in seven.146 These estimates are much larger than observers
supposed before America’s “discovery of innocence” in the 1990s
raised awareness of the problem.147 The steep decline in capital
punishment in the United States since 2000—death sentences have
dropped seventy-five percent and executions are down sixty per-
cent148—has several causes, but the most important appears to be
public concern about wrongful convictions, which has made prose-
cutors, judges, juries, and governors more cautious about capital
punishment.149
Since 1945, only eight persons have been sentenced to death or
life imprisonment in Japan and subsequently acquitted at retrial.
(Hakamada Iwao will likely become number nine if he does not die
before his retrial is completed; he was released in March 2014 after
serving forty-five years on death row for four murders he probably
did not commit.)150 This is an average of one exoneration every
eight years or so—a small fraction of the frequency in the United
States.151
More broadly, it is impossible to know how many persons have
been wrongfully convicted in Japan, and educated estimates are
rare. But one recent effort to count identified a total of only 162
cases of confirmed or strongly suspected wrongful conviction be-
tween 1910 and 2010.152 All the wrongful convictions were
discovered after the Pacific War ended in 1945, and more than half
145. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who are Sen-
tenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014); see also Samuel R. Gross, Opinion, The
Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in America, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-of-convicting-the-innocent/2015/07/24/260fc3a2-
1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html.
146. MARAZZITI, supra note 116, at 187.
147. See generally BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 73.
148. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 19.
149. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 73, at 166–68.
150. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Soul-Searching as Japan Ends a Man’s Decades on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2014, at A1.
151. Johnson, supra note 92.
152. Nishijima, Katsuhiko, Enzai Jiken Ichiranhyo: Kaisetsu [Summary of Wrongful Conviction
Cases: An Interpretation], in ENZAI GEN’IN O CHOSASEYO KOKKAI NI DAISANSHA KIKAN NO SETCHI
WO [SEARCH FOR THE CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AN APPEAL TO PARLIAMENT TO ESTAB-
LISH AN INDEPENDENT INSTITUTION], infra note 159, at 155–68.
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involved the crime of homicide.153 In this survey, the average num-
ber of wrongful convictions per decade is sixteen, with a high of
thirty-seven in the 1950s. Even in the peak decade, there were less
than four wrongful convictions per year. In a century of Japanese
criminal justice, 162 wrongful convictions is surely a large un-
dercount. This number probably represents the “tip of an iceberg”
of wrongful convictions for three reasons: because old cases are dif-
ficult to document (the prewar totals are implausibly low); because
less serious crimes such as drug offenses and sexual molestation fell
outside the scope of this study; and because, most fundamentally,
many cases of wrongful conviction are never discovered. How big is
the rest of Japan’s iceberg?154
The small number of recognized wrongful convictions in Japan
allows two interpretations. One explanation is that Japanese prose-
cutors tend to be cautious about charging criminal cases. A
conservative charging policy—to avoid taking defendants to trial
who might be acquitted—is probably the main reason for Japan’s
high conviction rate.155 In Japan’s procuracy, this charging policy is
enforced through organizational mechanisms. One mechanism is a
kessai system of consultation and approval, where front-line prose-
cutors must discuss the propriety of their charge and sentence
request decisions with, and obtain approval from, their superiors.
These superiors also have a penchant for punishing prosecutors
who charge or try cases that end in acquittal.156 In this view, because
Japan’s prosecutors send fewer innocent persons to trial than do
their counterparts in the United States and other countries with
higher acquittal rates, Japanese criminal justice probably produces
fewer wrongful convictions.
The other explanation for the rarity of wrongful convictions in
Japan stresses their discovery, not their production. Japan has few
actors or institutions that focus on finding wrongful convictions,
which is why few are found. Japan has far fewer lawyers per capita
than the United States, and only a handful of them concentrate on
153. Id.
154. David T. Johnson, Nihon no Enzai to “Hitei no Bunka” [Wrongful Convictions and the
“Culture of Denial” in Japan], 864 SEKAI 216, 216–226 (2015), http://japanfocus.org/-
David_T_-Johnson/4273/article.html. NIHON BENGOSHI RENGO¯KAI JINKEN YO¯GO IINKAI HEN
[COMM. FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS], GOHAN GEN’IN NO
JISSHOTEKI KENKYU [EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION] (1998);
NIHON BENGOSHI RENGO¯KAI JINKEN YO¯GO IINKAI HEN [COMM. FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS], GOHAN GEN’IN NI SEMARU KEIJI BENGO NO SHITEN TO GIJUTSU
[ATTACKING THE CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES OF CRIMI-
NAL DEFENSE] (2009).
155. JOHNSON, supra note 93, at 237.
156. See id. at 237–42.
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criminal defense.157 The country’s major newspapers do little inves-
tigative reporting.158 Few Japanese scholars study wrongful
convictions.159 Japan’s appellate courts tend to rule in favor of the
state by ratifying the status quo.160 Japan has no exoneration regis-
tries or Innocence Projects like those that exist in the United
States.161 Japan has few case review commissions of the kind found
in the United Kingdom; the main exception is the Japan Federation
of Bar Association’s Committee for the Protection of Human
Rights, which has reviewed some problematic cases and has pub-
lished two reports on this problem (in 1998 and 2009).162 However,
the Committee is hardly capable of providing assistance to all vic-
tims of wrongful conviction in the world’s tenth most populous
nation.163
The number of wrongful convictions revealed in any country de-
pends on how many are produced and how effectively they are
discovered and acknowledged. Japan’s institutional shortcomings
suggest that its wrongful conviction problem may well be much
larger than it appears. When Kitani Akira was a chief judge in
Urawa city in the late 1980s and early 1990s, he acquitted two or
three defendants each year; none of the acquittals were overturned
on appeal.164 Is it plausible that Japanese judges in Urawa and other
jurisdictions could go year after year without issuing a single acquit-
tal or wrongfully convicting a single defendant? Surveys of Japanese
lawyers in 1989 and 1999 suggest the answer is no. In both years,
more than forty percent of respondents said that they believed they
had handled cases in which a wrongful conviction occurred.165 One
157. See David T. Johnson, War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers and Lay Judges
in Japanese Criminal Justice, 9 ASIA-PAC. J., July 2011, at 1–11, http://japanfocus.org/site/view/
3554; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates, Discussion Paper No.
681, JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECON., & BUS. 5 (2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf.
158. See LAURIE ANNE FREEMAN, CLOSING THE SHOP: INFORMATION CARTELS AND JAPAN’S
MASS MEDIA 21 (2000); IVAN P. HALL, CARTELS OF THE MIND: JAPAN’S INTELLECTUAL CLOSED
SHOP 48 (1998).
159. There are, however, two notable recent exceptions: ENZAI GEN’IN O CHOSASEYO KOK-
KAI NI DAISANSHA KIKAN NO SETCHI WO [SEARCH FOR THE CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AN APPEAL TO PARLIAMENT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT INSTITUTION] (Nichibenren Enzai
Gen’in Kyumei Daisansha Kikan WG eds., 2012) and HARADA KUNIO, GYAKUTEN MUZAI NO
JIJITSU NINTEI [REVERSED ON THE FACTS] (2012).
160. JOHNSON, supra note 93, at 62.
161. Johnson, supra note 154.
162. NIHON BENGOSHI RENGO¯KAI JINKEN YO¯GO IINKAI HEN, supra note 154.
163. Nishijima, supra note 152; Johnson, supra note 154.
164. AKIRA KITANI, “MUZAI” O MINUKU: SAIBANKAN KITANI AKIRA NO IKIKATA [SEEING “AC-
QUITTALS”: THE WAY OF JUDGE KITANI AKIRA] (Ryudi Yamada et al. eds., 2013).
165. NIHON BENGOSHI RENGO¯KAI [JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS], ATARASHII SEIKI NO KEIJI
TETSUZUKI O MOTOMETE: KEIJI SOSHO¯ HO¯ 50 NEN_EMATSUE TAIKAI KARA 10 NEN NO KISEKI TO
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prominent Japanese defense lawyer estimated that the country’s
true total of wrongful convictions is much larger than the tiny num-
ber that is captured in official statistics and published studies. In his
view, Japan may produce as many as 1,500 wrongful convictions per
year, only a small fraction of which are ever discovered.166
B. Death Is Not Different
After four men on Japan’s death row were exonerated in the
1980s,167 some analysts expected Japanese capital punishment to
wither away or be abolished.168 The exonerations did motivate an
informal forty month moratorium on executions from 1989 to
1993, but little else in the country’s capital punishment complex
changed.169 In the United States, the “accumulating aberrations” of
wrongful convictions170 have been the most important force for
change in capital punishment.171 But where wrongful convictions
are rare, as in Japan, the failure of “aberrations” to accumulate
helps explain the failure of reform urgency in death penalty law
and practice.
“Actual innocence” is hardly the only problem that afflicts capital
punishment in the United States, for death sentences are also im-
posed on many U.S. defendants who are guilty but whose crimes do
not warrant execution. A classic study of 4,578 death sentences im-
posed between 1973 and 1995 found that sixty-eight percent were
overturned on appeal because of “serious error” in the original cap-
ital trial.172 When those cases were retried, eighty-two percent
resulted in a sentence less than death, and seven percent ended in
acquittal.173 These findings suggest that U.S. capital punishment
TENBO¯_FDAI 42 KAI JINKEN YO¯GO TAIKAI SHINPOJIUMU DAI 1 BUNKA KAI KICHO¯ HO¯KOKUSHO;
QUEST FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE NEW CENTURY AT 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF CODE OF CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DECADE AFTER MATSUE CONVENTION AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS: THE BASELINE REPORT FOR THE 1ST BREAKOUT SESSION OF THE SYMPOSIUM IN 42ND
CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (1999).
166. Takashi Takano, Nihon no Kensatsu wa Hetare nanoka, KEIJI SAIBAN O KANGAERU BLOG
(June 23, 2009).
167. Foote, supra note 117, at 11.
168. Yoshihiro Yasuda, Nagoya – Fukuoka no Nimei Shikko ni Kogi Suru, in SHIKEI HAISHI
HOAN – Nenpo SHIKEI HAISHI HENSHU [ANNUAL REPORT FOR ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY:
THE BILL TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY] 258-261 (2003).
169. See Part II, supra.
170. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1999, at 70.
171. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 73, at 200.
172. Liebman et al., supra note 84, at 38.
173. Id. at ii.
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has all the consistency of a lottery. Errors in fact-finding and assess-
ing culpability are so pervasive that U.S. capital punishment has
been called “a broken system.”174 One reason so much error is
found in American capital trials is the U.S. Supreme Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence, which holds that since death is different175
than other criminal sanctions, special procedures and protections
are required in capital cases.176 Most notably, ordinary due process
is not enough; there must be “super due process.”177 Super due pro-
cess has at least five implications in American criminal
procedure.178 First, capital trials must be carried out in two separate
stages: first determining the guilt of a defendant and then, if the
verdict returns guilty, deciding the sentence.179 Second, judges
must give capital juries guidelines on “aggravating” and “mitigat-
ing” factors to help direct their discretion at the sentencing stage.180
Third, after a death sentence has been imposed, it receives auto-
matic appellate review, regardless of the defendant’s wishes. In
most U.S. jurisdictions, defendants who have been sentenced to
death cannot waive their right to appeal.181 Fourth, some U.S. ap-
pellate courts engage in proportionality review to identify
inappropriate disparities in sentencing practice.182 The underlying
principle for this practice is that like cases should be treated alike
and different cases differently.183 Finally, in order to impose a capi-
tal sentence, all twelve jurors must agree that death is the
appropriate sanction.184 For the defense, this means that a sentence
of death can be prevented by convincing a single juror to oppose
that outcome. Clarence Darrow, one of the most famous defense
lawyers in U.S. history, defended more than one hundred persons
in capital trials during a career that spanned half a century.185 Not
one of his clients was sentenced to death.186 If Darrow had faced a
majority decision rule like the one that prevails in lay judge trials in
Japan,187 he surely would have had a different record.
174. Id. at 116.
175. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285–291 (1972).
176. See ROBERT M. BOHM, ULTIMATE SANCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE DEATH PENALTY
THROUGH ITS MANY VOICES AND MANY SIDES vi–xxi (2010).
177. Id. at vii.
178. See id. at vii–ix, xvii.
179. See id. at vii.
180. See id. at vii–ix.
181. See id. at ix.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at xvii.
185. See JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (2011).
186. See id.
187. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
SUMMER 2016] Retention and Reform 877
In Japan, death is not different. In Japan, there is no promise of
super due process for capital defendants and appellants. In Japan,
the jurisprudence of capital punishment looks much like the juris-
prudence for ordinary criminal cases. In Japan, there is no advance
notice from prosecutors about whether a case is capital and prose-
cutors only make this disclosure on the penultimate day of trial. In
Japan, there is no separate stage for sentencing as criminal trials are
not bifurcated. In Japan, death sentencing standards are hopelessly
vague (the 1983 Nagayama decision listed nine factors,188 but there
is no guidance about how to weigh them). In Japan, there is no
automatic appellate review for defendants who have been sen-
tenced to death, and more than one-third of persons executed in
recent years never had their case heard by the Supreme Court. In
Japan, there are no special procedures for selecting lay judges, and
lay judges are not permitted to discuss their trial experiences after a
verdict is rendered.  In Japan, the law is not explained in open
court, but is explained to these lay judges in the privacy of the de-
liberation room.  In Japan, death sentence decisions may be made
by a mere majority (a “mixed majority” of five votes suffices, pro-
vided that at least one of the five comes from a professional judge).
And in Japan, prosecutors are allowed to, and regularly do, appeal
sentences less than death.189
“Law seeks to work in the world,”190 and it can fail in more than
one way. When it comes to capital punishment, law in the United
States does not fulfill many of its promises,191 whereas law in Japan
fails by refusing to make many promises at all.192 Japan’s failure of
aspiration and political will helps explain the continuity in that
country’s system of capital punishment; this failure explains why no
justices on the Japanese Supreme Court have converted to anti-
death penalty stances, as several U.S. Supreme Court justices have
done.193 When few legal conditions are required to issue or confirm
188. The Nagayama factors are: (1) the character of the crime, (2) the defendant’s mo-
tive, (3) the crime situation (cruelty and heinousness), (4) the importance of the result
(especially the number of victims), (5) the feelings of victims and survivors, (6) the social
effects of the crime, (7) the age of the defendant, (8) his or her prior record, and (9) the
circumstances after the crime (such as whether the defendant repents and apologizes). See
Saiko¯ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 8, 1983, 1981 (A) 1505, 37 SAIKO¯ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHUˆ
[KEISHUˆ] 609 (Japan); KENJI, supra note 126.
189. Johnson, supra note 98, at 180.
190. AUSTIN SARAT, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 1 (2004).
191. TUROW, supra note 31, at 114–15.
192. Johnson, supra note 98, at 182.
193. See generally Carol Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOWARD L.J. 525,
525–58 (2009); see also Andrew Cohen, Why Don’t Supreme Court Justices Ever Change Their Minds
in Favor of the Death Penalty, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/na-
tional/archive/2013/12/why-dont-supreme-court-justices-ever-change-their-minds-in-em-
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a sentence of death, there is little reason for Japanese Justices to be
disappointed about how death is administered or to change their
minds about the institution. When the large majority of capital
sentences are deemed to be legally and constitutionally proper,
there is little reason to push for reform because the system does not
look broken.
The method of appointing justices to Japan’s Supreme Court
also explains the maintenance of the country’s death is not differ-
ent jurisprudence and the deference the Supreme Court routinely
shows towards other parts of government, including the
procuracy.194 Article 79 of Japan’s postwar constitution (1947) em-
powers the Cabinet to appoint Supreme Court justices.195 The LDP-
dominated Cabinets have exercised this control through three prac-
tices not written into law.196 First, and with few exceptions,
appointees to Japan’s Supreme Court must be at least sixty-four
years old (the Court Act requires that they retire by age seventy).197
Second, the appointment process is carried out in such secrecy that
the media and public only learn the identities of new justices after
they have been appointed.198 Third, a fixed number of seats on Ja-
pan’s Supreme Court are allocated to different segments of the
legal and governmental communities, with ten of the fifteen seats
reserved for professional judges, prosecutors, and other career pub-
lic officials, and only five allocated to persons who have worked for
most of their careers outside of government, thereby ensuring that
career government officials control the grand bench and all three
of the petty benches.199 As long as these appointment patterns re-
main in place, Japan’s Supreme Court is unlikely to take a strong
stance on behalf of capital defendants or other individuals in con-
flict with the state.200
favor-em-of-the-death-penalty/282100/; EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND
RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 432–40 (2013).
194. Daniel H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field, 72
HOSHAKAIGAKU 6, 6–45 (2010).
195. NIHONKOKU KENPO¯ [KENPO¯] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79 (Japan).




200. Id. at 49.
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C. The State Kills in Secret
The German sociologist Georg Simmel observed that “the pur-
pose of secrecy is, above all, protection.”201 Executions in Japan are
surrounded by secrecy that is taken to extremes seldom seen in
other death penalty nations.202 This secrecy mainly functions to pro-
tect Japan’s system of capital punishment—including the premise
that death is not different—from outside criticism.203 This insulates
the prosecutors who largely control the inputs in Japan’s capital jus-
tice system (for whom is a sentence of death sought?) and the
system’s outputs (who gets executed?).204 The policy of secrecy also
helps explain why Japan’s sole method of execution—hanging—
has not been changed since the 1870s. In the United States over the
same period of time there have been numerous changes, from
hanging, to the electric chair, to the gas chamber, to various proto-
cols for lethal injection.205 Executions are regularly botched in the
United States,206 and sometimes these “gruesome spectacles” have
prompted judicial intervention and legislative reform.207 Executions
are also botched in Japan, but they never become newsworthy be-
cause the state officials who observe hangings are not permitted to
discuss them.208 There is “no government power greater than the
power of life and death and no government intrusion more invasive
than the death penalty.”209 There is, therefore, no government
power in greater need of public oversight. In Japan that oversight is
201. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 345 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., trans.,
1950) (original emphasis omitted).
202. See generally David T. Johnson, The Death Penalty in Japan: Secrecy, Silence, and Salience,
in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 251 (Austin Sarat
& Christian Boulanger eds., 2005).
203. See generally Johnson, supra note 40.
204. Japanese prosecutors, like most criminal justice officials, want to preserve their dis-
cretion to decide matters that matter. One lesson from America is that the effort to tame a
criminal justice system by controlling discretion “faces a number of important obstacles,”
including sheer inertia and the lack of commitment to change. See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING
THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 151 (1993).
205. Deborah W. Denno, Lethally Humane? The Evolution of Execution Methods in the United
States, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRE-
SENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 547, 693–762 (James A. Acker, et al.
eds., 1998).
206. See generally Marian J.  Borg & Michael L. Radelet, On Botched Executions, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION 143 (Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds.,
2004); Michael L. Radelet, Examples of Post-Furman Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER (July 24, 2014), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-
botched-executions (showing 46 examples of botched executions as of  July 24, 2014).
207. See generally SARAT, supra note 131.
208. See generally Johnson, supra note 40.
209. Id. at 256.
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missing, and so are efforts to reform a method of execution that has
not been used in the United States (in Delaware) since 1996.210
Some analysts expected Japan’s lay judge reform to make capital
punishment more salient in society by requiring citizen participa-
tion into the death sentencing process.211 The new trial system has
attracted more media attention to capital punishment, but this at-
tention has not problematized the death penalty as an institution,
nor has it raised serious questions about the propriety of capital
sentencing.212 Even after the lay judge reform, avoidance of capital
punishment and ambivalence toward the institution remain two cen-
tral frames in Japan’s media coverage.213 The norm of secrecy has
extended to cover lay judges, who are forbidden by law from dis-
closing information about their experiences at trial; lay judges can
be criminal sanctioned for violating this rule.214 The coerced si-
lence of Japan’s lay judges prevents them from discussing problems
they perceived in hearings or deliberations and prevents the public
from learning how life and death decisions get made. Perhaps the
most critical function of this secrecy is the protection of profes-
sional judges, whose attitudes, words, and actions cannot be
revealed or criticized.215
Where the state kills in secret and imposes silence on execution
teams and life-and-death decision-makers, capital punishment is
less salient than it otherwise would be. Public support for capital
punishment remains the main official justification for retaining the
institution and carrying out executions.216 But the Japanese public’s
understanding of capital punishment is neither deep nor sophisti-
cated, so this rationale for retention may be “based on very shaky
grounds.”217
210. MARAZZITI, supra note 116, at 79.
211. See generally Leah Ambler, The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the Quasi-
Jury System (Saiban-In Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1 (2007).
212. See generally Johnson, supra note 92.
213. See generally Kita & Johnson, supra note 140.
214. SAIBANIN NO ATAMA NO NAKA: 14NIN NO HAJIMETE MONOGATARI [INSIDE THE HEADS OF
LAY JUDGES: 14 PEOPLE TELL THEIR STORIES FOR THE FIRST TIME] 7 (Masayoshi Taguchi ed.,
2013).
215. See generally Mark Levin & Virginia Tice, Japan’s New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy Imperils
Reform, 7 ASIA-PAC. J. May 2009, at 1–13, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Virginia-Tice/3141/arti
cle.html.
216. SATO, supra note 68, at 191.
217. Carolyn Hoyle, Foreword to SATO, supra note 68, at 8.
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D. Race Is Not Salient
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Furman v. Georgia decision in
1972, which held that capital punishment as then practiced was un-
constitutional, the Court “reinvented” the death penalty in three
ways.218 The Court’s rationalizing and juridifying jurisprudence
aimed to subject capital punishment administration to “the disci-
pline of legal rules and procedures.”219 Its civilizing and
humanizing jurisprudence aimed to “minimize the more disturbing
elements” of America’s death penalty process.220 And its democra-
tizing and localizing jurisprudence insisted on “returning control of
capital punishment” to state legislators and to prosecutors, judges,
and juries at the local level.221 Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
efforts to reinvent capital punishment have failed in many ways.222
The Court’s ambition was large, and one result of its reform at-
tempts is a death penalty system that is “peculiar” and that is
“presided over with weary resignation by a Supreme Court that no
longer seems interested in the issue but that retains responsibility
nevertheless.”223
Most Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court were not eager to re-
form capital punishment.224 Rather, they were pushed to pursue
reform by forces in American society, especially by concerns that
capital punishment administration was racially biased.225 This racial
spur to reform is nothing new in American capital punishment. In
the first half of the nineteenth century, debates over capital punish-
ment engulfed the northern states but were almost absent in the
South; that difference was “a product of slavery.”226 Today, the his-
tory of race relations in the United States creates public sensitivity
to the fact that minorities are wrongfully accused and convicted and
that the seriousness of their victimization is discounted for no prin-
cipled reason.227 In American criminal justice, communities of




222. See generally TUROW, supra note 31.
223. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 284.
224. See id. at 258.
225. See MANDERY, supra note 193, at 428; see generally DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOOD-
WORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
226. BANNER, supra note 8, at 113.
227. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
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color and their allies “routinely come forward to push for the inter-
ests of criminal suspects and convicted persons.”228 In American
capital punishment, the reality of racial disparity and discrimina-
tion remains a major reason for reform.229
Japan is different in this regard too, even if it is not as homogene-
ously mono-ethnic as many people suppose.230 Despite the presence
of many “visible minorities” in Japan,231 the perception of homogene-
ity makes it difficult to move the country toward a system of capital
punishment that “sufficiently contemplates the rights and circum-
stances” of criminal suspects and defendants, since persons
suspected or accused of murder garner little sympathy in Japanese
society.232 The homogeneity assumption means there is little grass-
roots motivation to push for reform. Instead, “Japan’s reform
process is driven almost entirely by legal and governmental elites,”
with “little participation by the broader public.”233
Altering the perception that Japan is homogeneous is a formida-
ble challenge, not least because Japan is nationalistic. Invocations
of racial purity, however unfounded they may be, resonate with
large segments of the Japanese public and are politically useful to
many Japanese leaders.234 If there is any hope for changing the pre-
sumption that Japan is homogenous, perhaps it lies in the
possibility that the country will open its doors to more foreigners as
a way of addressing a growing demographic crisis (rising lifespans
and falling birthrates) that will lead to major shrinkage in Japan’s
population and big challenges for Japan’s economy (how to pro-
vide labor and pay for pensions in a society that is getting grayer
every year?).235 More open borders would mean more immigrants
and more visible minorities, which might lead to more conscious-
ness of racial inequalities in the criminal and capital justice systems.
This kind of opening to the world, however, is unlikely to occur on
a large enough scale to make a significant difference anytime soon.
228. Mark A. Levin, Considering Japanese Criminal Justice from an Original Position, 857 SEKAI
112 (2014).
229. See generally GARLAND, supra note 7; see FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE,
supra note 227 at 228–29.
230. See DEBITO ARUDOU, EMBEDDED RACISM: JAPAN’S VISIBLE MINORITIES AND RACIAL DIS-
CRIMINATION 8–9 (2015).
231. Id.
232. Levin, supra note 228, at 122.
233. Id. at 3.
234. See CHRISTOPHER P. HOOD, JAPAN: THE BASICS 110–30 (2015).
235. See ARUDOU, supra note 230, at 289.
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In sum, American capital punishment—and American criminal
justice generally—functions partly as a system of racialized con-
trol,236 but the racial inequalities reflected and reproduced in
American law have also been a force for progressive reform.237 Fo-
cusing on America illustrates how social conflict can foster
significant institutional change. Focusing on Japan, by contrast,
shows how a paucity of conflict can inhibit change. Reform of capi-
tal punishment sometimes fails in this way, too.
IV. REFORM
Reform in Japanese capital punishment could occur by altering
the causes of its continuity. As explained above, making race, class,
and inequality in Japanese criminal justice more salient will be hard
to do, but the other causes of continuity described in the previous
Part are susceptible to change if there is political will.238
Japanese public support for capital punishment would probably
soften if the country developed the kinds of institutions that helped
expose wrongful convictions in countries such as the United States
and the United Kingdom. These institutions include Innocence
Projects, innocence commissions, exoneration registries, and ag-
gressive investigative journalism. There are signs that Japan is trying
to address some of these structural reform challenges.239 At the
same time, for more wrongful convictions to be revealed and re-
versed, Japan needs to change a culture that is reluctant to
acknowledge their possibility.240 This cultural imperative requires
adopting at least three principles.241 First, in order to reduce error,
one must assume error is inevitable.242 Second, successful strategies
of error prevention identify and learn from mistakes through
processes that are open and transparent.243 Third, error prevention
works best when criminal justice is administered based on data and
236. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 21–22 (2012).
237. See ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE AMONG THE
WORST OF THE WORST 236 (2013).
238. See supra notes 141–218 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., New Technologies, Improved Practices May Boost Number of Criminal Retrials, JAPAN
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/02/national/crime-le-
gal/new-technologies-improved-practices-may-boost-number-of-criminal-retrials (explaining
that DNA forensic science innovations and implementation of a lay judge system could aid
the wrongfully convicted).
240. See Johnson, supra note 154, at 216.
241. KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES IN THE MARGIN OF ERROR 304 (2010).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 304–05.
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facts rather than on opinions, assumptions, and standard operating
procedures.244
Capital punishment in Japan might also change if death were
deemed to be a sufficiently “different” criminal sanction so as to
require special procedures and protections in capital cases. Several
reforms are essential. In murder cases, prosecutors should be re-
quired to provide the defense with advance notice of whether they
will seek a capital sentence. Capital trials should be bifurcated so
that defendants can put on more mitigating evidence without un-
dermining their efforts to obtain an acquittal. Victims should not
be allowed to express their desire for punishment before the guilt
stage of a trial has concluded.245 Capital sentencing standards
should be made clearer and more precise. Automatic appellate re-
view should follow every capital conviction and sentence.
Prosecutors should not be permitted to appeal sentences less than
death. And in murder trials, conviction and a capital sentence
should require more than a mere mixed majority of the three pro-
fessional and six lay judges who sit in judgment. Until Japan
implements these reforms, it cannot credibly claim that its system of
capital punishment is “cautious” (shincho) about administering the
ultimate sanction.246 And by raising legal expectations in potentially
capital cases, more problems in Japanese capital punishment will be
exposed, creating more pressure to change the present system.247
Finally, changes in the secrecy that surrounds Japanese execu-
tions are long overdue, and greater transparency might make
capital punishment both more salient and more problematic in Ja-
pan’s political culture.248 Three changes seem crucial. Death row
inmates should be told the time of their execution at least several
days before they are hanged (instead of a mere hour or two), and
the Japanese media and public should be informed at the same
time an inmate is. A few members of the media and a limited num-
ber of relatives and friends of the victim(s) and the condemned
should be allowed to observe hangings. And inmates on death row
should have significantly more freedom to meet visitors and corre-
spond with people in the free world. Secrecy protects capital
punishment from scrutiny in many of the world’s death penalty sys-
tems, but in Japan that secrecy is “taken to extremes not seen in
244. Id. at 305–07.
245. See Masahiko Saeki, Victim Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan, 38 INT’L. J.L.,
CRIME & JUST. 149, 150 (2010) (stating that victim statements may not be used by fact-finders
as evidence of the crime).
246. See Johnson, supra note 98, at 172–75.
247. Id. at 175–82.
248. See Johnson, supra note 202, at 264–68.
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other nations,”249 and the justifications for killing in secret are not
convincing:
If the extreme isolation on death row helps some condemned
‘accept the inevitable’ and ‘prepare for death,’ it does so by
killing them twice, first socially and then physically. If secrecy
is designed to protect the ‘privacy and dignity’ of offenders
and their families, it does so by sacrificing democratic values—
transparency, accountability, and public reasoning—at pre-
cisely those times when they should be most operative. And if
silence helps maintain ‘stability’ on death row, it does so
through a mechanism of terror that profoundly destabilizes
the psyches of the condemned (and turns some of them
psychotic). ‘Am I next?’ and ‘Is today the day?’ are questions
that naturally preoccupy the people on death row. The uncer-
tainty which surrounds them makes them easier to govern, for
some condemned believe their own misbehavior could hasten
an appointment with the hangman.250
There is not much public pressure in Japan for the reforms pro-
posed here.251 Nonetheless, for people who would like to see
change in Japanese capital punishment, the good news comes from
other countries, where major death penalty reforms, including out-
right abolitions and multi-year moratoria on executions, seldom
depended on public opinion or on changes in other parts of their
criminal justice systems. The Philippines, Thailand, South Korea,
and Taiwan have all experienced abolition or moratoria, and the
key cause of reform was not a large shift in public opinion or a
reform revolution in criminal justice, but rather “leadership from
the front” by elite officials in the face of public resistance, apathy,
or both.252 In this respect, the reform of capital punishment in Ja-
pan is primarily a political challenge.
249. Johnson, supra note 40, at 253.
250. Id. at 267–68 (citations omitted).
251. See generally SATO, supra note 68; Johnson, supra note 40, at 268–72.
252. See, e.g., JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 14. “Leadership from the front” was also a
crucial cause of abolition in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other Western
countries. See ANDREW HAMEL, ENDING THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 168 (2010).
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a triumphalism in much writing about capital punish-
ment. Some of it is in response to the remarkable progress toward
abolition that has occurred in the world, and some of it is in antici-
pation of a future that is believed to hold the certainty of abolition
everywhere. According to two prominent analysts, “great progress
[has been] made towards worldwide abolition of capital punish-
ment over the past quarter of a century.”253 According to another,
“it seems that nothing can stop continued progress towards univer-
sal abolition.”254 I, too, would like to see abolition spread, and I
favor some reforms that would restrict the scope and scale of capital
punishment in retentionist countries such as the United States and
Japan. But in death penalty scholarship, there are few serious stud-
ies of failures of abolition, especially outside the United States.255
This Article has aimed to describe and explain the failure of aboli-
tion and of death penalty reform in Japan, one of three major
democracies to retain capital punishment (the others are the
United States and India).
The case of Japan suggests that abolition may be neither near
nor certain in some societies, and something similar might be said
about reforms that would restrict the scope and scale of capital pun-
ishment in other retentionist nations.256 This Article’s focus on
reform failure seeks to be instructive to death penalty analysts and
activists in two ways: by revealing contingencies and complexities in
the future trajectories of capital punishment in the world, and by
helping death penalty opponents discern how to move toward re-
forms they favor by identifying obstacles to change. Paying
attention to how “every death penalty nation is retentionist in its
own way”257 may also create greater curiosity about this institution’s
“possible positive effects,”258 which have been neglected in death
penalty scholarship.259 The notion that capital punishment “repre-
sents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only
253. Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, Progress Made for Worldwide Abolishment of Death Penalty,
6 INT’L AFF. F. 8, 8 (2015).
254. Schabas, supra note 22, at 13.
255. Temkin, supra note 8.
256. For a variety of views about the future of capital punishment in America, see THE
ROAD TO ABOLITION?, supra note 63.
257. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 22.
258. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 23 (Vintage
Books 1977).
259. See GARLAND, supra note 7, at 285.
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marginal contributions to any discernible social or public pur-
poses”260 may be inspiring rhetoric to many abolitionists, but it is
bad sociology. So is the sweeping claim that “even when its aims are
modest, capital punishment fails to achieve them.”261As David Gar-
land has shown in his masterful account of U.S. capital punishment
in “the age of abolition”:
If we insist, with Foucault, on a positive account of capital pun-
ishment’s uses and utilities, even those that at first seem
marginal or unimportant, then a picture emerges that turns
the conventional wisdom upside down. What becomes appar-
ent is that the state’s power to kill is actually productive,
performative, and generative—that it makes things happen—
even if much of what happens is in the cultural realm of death
penalty discourse rather than in the biological realm of life
and death.262
Capital punishment persists in Japan (and the United States)
partly because it performs some positive functions. For prosecutors,
it is a practical instrument that allows them to “harness the power of
death in the pursuit of professional objectives.”263 For elected offi-
cials, it is “a political token in an electoral game” that is played
before viewing and voting audiences.264 For the media and on-look-
ing public, it is “variously an edifying morality play, a vehicle for
moral outrage, a prurient entertainment, or an opportunity for the
expression of hatreds and aggressions otherwise prohibited.”265 For
victims and survivors of crime, it is believed to be a mechanism for
achieving retribution and atonement.266 And for the general public,
it is deemed to deter homicide.267 Even if these beliefs are founded
in faith more than fact, they are subjectively meaningful to the be-
lievers and therefore are sociologically significant.
260. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 85 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotations
omitted).
261. MARAZZITI, supra note 116, at 201.
262. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 285–86.
263. Id. at 288; see generally AOKI OSAMU, KOSHUKEI [Hanging] (2009).
264. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 288; see also Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Puni-
tiveness and the Rising Populism in Japanese Criminal Justice Policy, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 47,
72–73 (2008).
265. GARLAND, supra note 7, at 288–89.
266. Kita & Johnson, supra note 140, at 227.
267. Kanji Muramatsu, David T. Johnson, and Koichi Yano, Nihon ni okeru Shikei to Genbat-
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Penalty and Harsher Punishment], in NIHON KEIZAI GAKKAI SHUNKI TAIKAI [JAPAN ECONOMIC AS-
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Yet the stasis in Japanese capital punishment described in this
Article stems more from what is not found in and around the insti-
tution than from how it “makes things happen” in Japanese law and
society. Japan has not discovered many wrongful convictions. Japan
has not operationalized the principle that death is a different kind
of criminal punishment. Japan is not open about how the state kills.
And Japan has not confronted social pressure to make its system of
capital punishment fairer to disadvantaged minorities. In all these
respects, Japan can be contrasted with the United States, where
markedly more death penalty reform has occurred.268
Other retentionist countries also resemble Japan in some of
these respects. In Singapore, which long has employed one of the
most aggressive death penalty systems in the world,269 and which is
hardly a paragon of due process,270 an article in the country’s lead-
ing law journal cavalierly concludes that “no sweeping reforms are
necessary” to reduce the risk of wrongful conviction.271 In Taiwan,
where the number of executions dropped dramatically as the coun-
try democratized272 but have rebounded in recent years, death is
not different as a matter of law or practice—and Taiwan has made
major mistakes in administering capital punishment, including the
wrongful execution of Chiang Kuo-Ching, which Taiwan’s govern-
ment acknowledged in 2011.273 And in the People’s Republic of
China, which continues to execute more prisoners than any other
country in the world, debate about the death penalty has become
more vigorous since 2000.274 But in spite of increased debate, many
parts of China’s capital punishment complex remain shrouded by
state-enforced secrecy, including prohibiting disclosure of how
many executions the country performs each year. The number is
still a top state secret.275
268. Temkin, supra note 8, at 7–8.
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The Anna Karenina principle suggests that success at reforming
or abolishing capital punishment “requires avoiding many separate
possible causes of failure.”276 The principle also implies that the
road to abolition is not merely a positive path that embraces “lead-
ership from the front” in the face of public opposition277 and the
human rights dynamic,278 although these are important proximate
causes of change. The road to abolition is also a “negative path”—
what the Greeks and Romans called via negativa—leading away
from assumptions, doctrines, and practices that present obstacles to
capital punishment’s abrogation or diminution.279 As in the pursuit
of happiness and success, so in the pursuit of a world without this
form of state killing: negative knowledge (what not to do) can be
even more potent than positive knowledge (what to do).280 Think-
ing about what makes each country “retentionist in its own way”
may inhibit the impulses to celebrate and lament in writing about
capital punishment, but it may also have the salutary effect of im-
proving our understanding of why it persists.
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